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PUNITIVE DAMAGE "OVERKILL" AFTER TXO
PRODUCTION CORP. v. ALLIANCE RESOURCES: THE
NEED FOR A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION
Punitive damages have long been available as a remedy in
civil lawsuits.' In recent years, however, they have been seri-
ously challenged on both legal and public policy grounds. During
the past decade, litigants have attacked punitive damages as
unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause,2 the Double
Jeopardy Clause,3 and the Due Process Clause.4 Tort reformer's
criticize punitive damages on public policy grounds, arguing that
awards have increased dramatically in size, scope, and frequency
in recent decades.5 Punitive damages, according to this view,
should be brought under control because they are both unfair
and economically destructive.6 One advocate of tort reform has
1. On the history of punitive damages, see 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH
R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 1.0-1.4 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993). One of the
first American cases to apply the doctrine of punitive damages was Coryell v.
Colbough, 1 N.J. (Coxe) 77 (1791), in which the defendant was assessed damages
"for example's sake" as well as to compensate the plaintiff. Id. at 77. By 1851, the
availability of "exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages" was "well established" in
American law and "[would not] admit of argument." Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 363, 371 (1851).
2. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); see
also infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
3. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); see also infra note 52.
4. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (plu-
rality opinion); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); see also infra
notes 54-97 and accompanying text.
5. STEPHEN M. TURNER ET. AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES EXPLOSION: FACT OR FICTION?
(Washington Legal Found. Working Paper No. 50, 1992); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
INDEPENDENT INSURERS, PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1985).
For a balanced overview that confirms in many respects the critics of punitive dam-
ages, see PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 4, 15 (Rand
Corp. 1987).
6. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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called punitive damages a "lightning rod" for public discontent
with the legal system.7 Indeed, highly publicized and seemingly
unjust punitive awards helped to make civil justice reform an
issue in the most recent presidential election! Defenders of
punitive damages, however, emphasize the useful role of such
awards in deterring and punishing socially undesirable con-
duct.9 Viewed from this perspective, punitive damages are "a
necessary remedy against the abuse of power by economic
elites,"'0 or, even more vividly, "a 'sword' [to be] wielded by rel-
atively powerless individuals and entities against giant
firms."" Some scholars also argue that the evidence cited by
the tort reformers is anecdotal and that large punitive damage
awards actually remain a relatively rare phenomenon. 2
An intriguing and unresolved aspect of the debate over puni-
tive damages concerns the phenomenon of punitive damage
"overkill." This phenomenon occurs when a single act or course
of conduct gives rise to multiple punitive damage awards. This
Note will begin with a brief description of the context in which
overkill occurs and an assessment of why multiple punitive
awards are problematic. Next, the Note will assess case law on
7. Nancy E. Roman, A PR Blitz is Dramatizing the Public Cost of "Junk Law-
suits" and Multimillion-Dollar Judgments, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, at Al
(quoting Martin Connor, President, American Tort Reform Association). In a 1993
case that attracted national media attention, a jury in Fulton County, Georgia
awarded $4 million in actual damages and $101 million in punitive damages after
finding that a negligently-designed gas tank in a General Motors truck was responsi-
ble for the death of the plaintiffs' son. Id. More recently, Domino's Pizza announced
that it would discontinue its guarantee of 30-minute delivery in part because of a
$78 million punitive damage award levied against it. In that case, the plaintiff suf-
fered head and spinal injuries when a Domino's driver ran a red light and struck
her car. Michael Janofsky, Domino's Ends Fast-Pizza Pledge After Big Award to
Crash Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1993, at Al.
8. See David Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bar Associa-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al.
9. THOMAS F. LAMBERT, JR., THE CASE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A NEW AUDIT
(1988); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269 (1993).
10. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 9, at 1276.
11. Id. at 1309.
12. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1990); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products
Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992).
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this subject, especially in light of the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncements on punitive damages in TXO Production Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp." Although the constitutionality of
overkill may remain an open question, courts will not soon re-
solve the problem. Moreover, legislative efforts to limit overkill
at the state level likely would prove ineffective.' Accordingly,
Congress should enact national legislation limiting multiple
punitive damage awards in mass tort litigation. In crafting such
legislation, Congress must evaluate proposals in terms of three
important criteria: (1) simplicity, (2) constitutionality, and (3)
fairness to all litigants. A number of proposals discussed in this
Note would reduce defendants' exposure to punitive overkill, but
only reform of class action procedures is likely to satisfy all
three of these legislative criteria.
DEFINING OVERKILL: MASS TORTS, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY
The issue of multiple punitive damage awards arises in the
context of mass tort litigation, a comparatively new area of the
law.15 In modern life, a single act or "course of conduct" can
affect thousands of individuals, as when a manufacturer mar-
kets a defective product or fails to provide adequate safety warn-
ings. Methods of mass production, marketing, and distribu-
tion-nonexistent when the common law of torts devel-
oped-now allow products to reach vast numbers of consumers.
Familiar instances of mass torts involving products include as-
bestos, 6 the Dalkon Shield IUD, 7 Agent Orange, 8 the Ford
Pinto, 9 and pharmaceuticals such as DES.2 ° Airplane crashes
13. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (plurality opinion).
14. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
15. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at
14 (5th ed. 1984) (describing "mass disasters" as a 20th century phenomenon).
16. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
18. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y.
1983), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
19. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (1981).
20. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
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and other large-scale disasters, because they involve large num-
bers of plaintiffs, also raise the possibility of punitive damage
overkill.2 ' Common law tort principles permit every individual
harmed by a defendant's conduct to sue for both actual and
punitive damages."
Multiple punitive damage awards based on a single act or
course of conduct pose several problems. First, they unfairly
punish defendants repeatedly for the same conduct. Multiple
awards also subject corporate defendants to potentially bank-
rupting liability. Often the blameworthy conduct that is the
basis for a punitive damage award occurred many years in the
past when a corporate defendant consisted of a completely differ-
ent set of officers, directors, employees, and shareholders. One
must ask whether extracting repetitive awards under such cir-
cumstances serves the essential purposes of punitive damag-
es-punishment and deterrence.
Additionally, successive punitive damage awards are unfair to
"late" plaintiffs, potentially depriving them of even compensatory
damages because large awards or settlements to earlier plain-
tiffs have bankrupted the defendant. Current asbestos litigation
demonstrates how the zealous pursuit of punitive damage
awards ultimately may deprive numerous plaintiffs of any possi-
ble remedy. Testifying before Congress, Judge William W.
Schwarzer summarized the crisis in asbestos litigation:
There are now some 100,000 asbestos cases pending in feder-
912 (1980).
21. See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 976 (1980).
22. Some jurisdictions have abolished or restricted punitive damages. The states
that disallowed punitive damages in all or most settings as of 1993 were: Connecti-
cut, Michigan, New Hampshire, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washing-
ton. 1 GHIARDI & KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW & PRACTICE § 4.07 (1985 &
Supp. 1993). However, only two states have specifically legislated against multiple
punitive awards. Until 1990, a Georgia statute allowed just one award of punitive
damages for any act or omission in a products liability action, "regardless of the
number of causes of action which may arise from such act or omission." GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (Michie 1994). Georgia's "first comer" statute has since been held
unconstitutional. See infra notes 133-34, 145 and accompanying text. Missouri credits
the defendant with prior payments of punitive damages. Mo. ANN. STAT. §
510.263(4) (Vernon 1994).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1977).
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al and state courts, and it is expected that over the next ten
years an equal number will be filed. Considering that nearly
every one of these cases includes a prayer for punitive dam-
ages, should such damages be awarded in many of these
cases, the aggregate amount would be far in excess of what
the defendants would be able to pay. Even without consider-
ing punitive damages, the compensation claims alone cur-
rently exceed the aggregate assets of the asbestos industry. 
2
Although most asbestos cases have settled or will settle out of
court, Judge Schwarzer notes that the settlement process, affect-
ed heavily by the availability of punitive damages, also "jeopar-
dizes the ability of future plaintiffs to recover compensation."25
Finally, successive punitive damage awards can have an unde-
sirable "chilling effect" on the development of potentially valu-
able new products2 and harm the competitiveness of American
firms.27
OVERKILL AND THE COURTS: PRACTICALITY, POWERLESSNESS,
AND DUE PROCESS
The courts generally have been unwilling to ratify a "first
comer" or "one bite" doctrine that would limit recovery of puni-
tive damages to those plaintiffs who arrive first at the court-
24. Asbestos Litigation Crisis in Federal and State Courts: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Judicia-
ry Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1992) [hereinafter Asbestos Hearings] (state-
ment of Judge William W. Schwarzer, Director, Federal Judicial Center).
25. Id. at 138. Adding to the unfairness is the reality that all asbestos claims are
not equally meritorious. Depending partly on the type of asbestos fiber to which the
plaintiff was exposed, symptoms may range from rare and deadly forms of lung
cancer to comparatively benign "pleural plaques" that have many causes other than
exposure to asbestos. See Suzanne L. Oliver & Leslie Spencer, Who Will the Monster
Devour Next?, FORBES, Feb. 18, 1991, at 75.
26. AMA BOARD OF TRUSTEES, IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ON THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF NEW MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (June 1988); E. McGuIRE, THE IMPACT OF
PRODUCT LIABLrYr, at vii (1988); Bruce N. Kuhik & Richard F. Kingham, The Ad-
verse Effects of Standardless Punitive Damage Awards on Pharmaceutical Develop-
ment and Availability, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 693 (1990).
27. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE RE-
FORM IN AMERICA (1991); Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559
(1992); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Impact of
U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Businesses Beating Us at Our Own Game?,
9 J.L. & COM. 167 (1989).
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house steps although they have recognized and sometimes have
sympathized with the "overkill" problem outlined above.2" The
decisions are based on constitutional grounds and the perceived
impracticality of court-ordered solutions to the problem. The
powerlessness of the courts is a recurring theme in these opin-
ions. For example, in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,9
the court noted that the plaintiff's lawsuit was the first of sever-
al hundred factually similar lawsuits involving injuries caused
by MER/29, the defendant's anti-cholesterol drug. ° The court
also recognized that the defendant's potential punitive liability
could reach into the tens of millions of dollars, far in excess of
the maximum criminal penalties for the defendant's conduct.3
Nevertheless, the frustrated author of the court's opinion failed
to see how the "multiplicity of actions throughout the nation
[could] be so administered as to avoid overkill."32 The court
therefore refused to announce a legal principle "whereby the
first punitive award exhausts all claims for punitive damages
and would thus preclude future judgments."3
A number of federal courts have rejected the constitutional
argument that multiple punitive awards violate due process. In
Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,' the defendant, a manu-
facturer of insulation containing asbestos, asked the court to
hold that imposition of multiple punitive awards violated the
"fundamental fairness" requirement of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."5 The court chose to focus narrowly on the requirement of
procedural due process, concluding that "[a]s a matter of federal
constitutional law we believe that the presence of a judicial
tribunal before which to litigate the propriety of a punitive dam-
28. See generally, 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.11(8) (2d ed. 1993);
Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Propriety of Awarding Punitive Damages to Separate
Plaintiffs Bringing Successive Actions Arising Out of Common Incident or Circum-
stances Against Common Defendant or Defendants ('One Bite" or 'First Comer" Doc-
trine), 11 A.L.R.4TH 1261 (1992).
29. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
30. Id. at 838.
31. Id. at 839.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986).
35. Id. at 1571.
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ages award provides Johns-Manville with all of the procedural
safeguards to which it is due."36 Similarly, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has held that multiple awards do not
necessarily violate either the substantive or procedural compo-
nents of the Due Process Clause." That court rejected the
appellant's "single punitive award" theory, arguing that it would
be impossible for the first trier of fact to assess a punitive award
with the understanding that it is "punish[ing] the tort-feasor for
the full extent of its wrongful conduct."" A short-lived excep-
tion to the general trend in these cases came in 1989 when a
federal district court in New Jersey held that multiple punitive
awards against the same defendant did violate the "fundamental
fairness" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.39 The
court found that "[t]he right to assess punitive damages in mass
tort litigation permits a jury to punish but not to execute a com-
pany."40 Upon reconsideration however, the court vacated this
earlier order.4' Although concerned about the defendant's due
process rights, the court cited two practical reasons for retreat-
ing from a judicially-imposed "first comer" rule: (1) the court's
inability to prevent future punitive awards by courts in other
jurisdictions,42 and (2) a nagging doubt that the first jury could
assess a single award that would take into account the full scope
of the defendant's misconduct.43 The court summed up the ex-
asperation of many courts over the inability of our judicial sys-
tem to deal with this problem: "Until there is uniformity either
through Supreme Court decision or national legislation, this
36. Id.
37. Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 281-82 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 497 U.S. 1057 (1990). On the issue of substantive due process, the court
held vaguely that the aggregate amount in punitive damages awarded thus far
against the defendant had not reached "whatever limit due process might impose on
the total punitive damages." Id. at 281. The court also rejected the appellants
claims of insufficient procedural safeguards such as inadequate jury instructions, a
low standard of proof, the absence of bifurcation, and a lack of "meaningful judicial
oversight." Id. at 282-84.
38. Id. at 280.
39. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1064 (D.N.J. 1989).
40. Id.
41. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F.- Supp. 1233, 1234-36 (D.N.J. 1989).
42. Id. at 1235.
43. Id.
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court is powerless to fashion a remedy which will protect the
due process rights of this defendant or other defendants similar-
ly situated.""
THE SUPREME COURT AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has never
squarely addressed punitive damage overkill, it has attempted
in recent years to address the constitutionality of "excessive"
single awards under various provisions of the Constitution. In
1988, a petitioner asked the Court to overturn a $1.6 million
punitive award that allegedly violated both the Excessive Fines
Clause and the Due Process Clause.45 However, the Court re-
fused to address the petitioner's claims because they had not
been properly raised and considered in state court.46 Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, believed that the Court's
hands-off approach would permit "a number of less intrusive,
and possibly more appropriate, resolutions" of the punitive dam-
ages issue by state legislatures or courts.47 Justice O'Connor
agreed that the due process question "should not be decided to-
day," but wrote separately to emphasize her view that the due
process implications of "permitting juries to impose unlimited
punitive damages on an ad hoc basis" were "worthy of the
Court's attention.
48
A year later, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc. ,4 the Court decisively rejected an Eighth Amendment "ex-
cessive fines" challenge to large punitive damage awards."
Evaluating the history and purposes of the Eighth Amendment,
the Court decided that the Framers never intended for it to ap-
ply to lawsuits involving private parties.5 ' Accordingly, the
Court held that punitive damages in civil lawsuits could not be
considered excessive fines as long as the government neither
44. Id.
45. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
46. Id. at 76.
47. Id. at 79-80.
48. Id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
50. Id. at 275-76.
51. Id. at 262-76.
758 [Vol. 36:751
PUNITIVE DAMAGE OVERKILL AFTER TXO
prosecuted the action nor had any right to recover a share of the
punitive damage award. 2 Because the petitioner failed to offer
a due process challenge in the district court or in the court of
appeals, the Supreme Court again refused to consider whether
the large punitive damage award in the case violated due pro-
cess, saying coyly that this inquiry would have to "await another
day."
53
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,' the Court at
last confronted two questions: (1) whether, in the absence of de-
finitive judicial guidelines, a procedure for determining punitive
damage awards could violate procedural due process and (2)
whether an award could be so excessive as to be inherently un-
fair and thus a violation of substantive due process.55 The
Court's answer to both questions, as one commentator observed,
was a "resounding 'maybe'."5
In Haslip, an insurance agent collected health insurance pre-
miums from the plaintiffs but failed to remit those payments to
the insurers, and the plaintiffs' insurance policies lapsed without
their knowledge." After one plaintiff was hospitalized and had
to pay medical expenses out-of-pocket, she claimed damages for
fraud." The plaintiffs joined the insurance company under a
theory of respondeat superior.59 The jury's verdict of over $1
million included a punitive award that was more than four
times the amount of compensatory damages requested by the
plaintiff.0 The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the award.6'
52. Id. at 275-76. The Court had previously ruled that "nothing . . . precludes a
private party from filing a civil suit seeking damages for conduct that previously,
was the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment. The protections of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by litigation between private parties." United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989).
53. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276-77.
54. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
55. See id. at 18.
56. William H. Volz & Michael C. Fayz, Punitive Damages and the Due Process
Clause: The Search for Constitutional Standards, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 459,
471 (1992).
57. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 5.
58. Id. at 5-6.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 7 n.2.
61. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989), aff'd, 499 U.S.
1995] 759
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The United States Supreme Court also upheld the award,
finding that neither the method by which it was determined, nor
its large size in relation to actual damages, violated due pro-
cess.62 The Court concluded that the defendant in Haslip had
enjoyed "the benefit of the full panoply of Alabama's procedural
protections,""3 which included jury instructions that placed rea-
sonable constraints on the jury's discretion, a post-verdict hear-
ing, and review by the state supreme court." On the murkier
issue of whether the size of the award violated substantive due
process, the Court concluded that while it was probably "close to
the line," the award in Haslip did not "cross the line into the
area of constitutional impropriety."65 Apart from this rough
indication of where the boundary might lie, the Court refused to
"draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally
acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit
every case," saying only that "general concerns of reasonable-
ness ... properly enter into the constitutional calculus."6
Significantly, however, a majority of the Court in Haslip ac-
knowledged for the first time that "unlimited jury discretion...
in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results
that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." 7 Commentators
seized on these words, arguing that they would become a power-
ful weapon to curb punitive damages, including multiple awards.
One article, coauthored by a prominent tort reform expert, pre-
dicted that Haslip would serve as "a strong foundation for creat-
ing due process limits to avoid overpunishment in [multiple
award] situations."" The Court soon demonstrated that such
1 (1992).
62. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24.
63. Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 19-21.
65. Id. at 23-24.
66. Id. at 18.
67. Id. Only Justice Scalia flatly rejected the notion that substantive due process
could place limits on the size of a punitive award. Id. at 24-40 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
68. Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Magarian, Multiple Punitive Damage Awards in
Mass Disaster and Product Liability Litigation: An Assault on Due Process, 8
ADELPHIA L.J. 101, 102 (1992). For another "optimistic" view of Haslip and its im-
port for reforming multiple punitive damages, see Dennis N. Jones et al., Multiple
Punitive Damages Awards for a Single Course of Wrongful Conduct: The Need for a
760 [Vol. 36:751
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hopes were misplaced.
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
The Court's recent plurality decision in TXO Production Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp.69 has weakened substantially any
"foundation" that Haslip may have laid for judicial reform of
multiple punitive awards. The facts of this case were unusual
and complex. TXO had negotiated a deal to acquire the mining
rights to some property in West Virginia. 7° Through various
legal maneuvers, it then created a cloud of title on the property
in order to renege on its agreement with Alliance. v" When TXO
sought a declaratory judgement on the status of the property,
Alliance counterclaimed for the unusual tort of "slander of title"
and won compensatory damages of $19,000 (the cost of defend-
ing the TXO action) plus punitive damages of $10 million.72 The
West Virginia Supreme Court upheld the verdict.7" The United
States Supreme Court disagreed with TXO that "a $10 million
punitive damages award-an award 526 times greater than the
actual damages awarded by the jury-is so excessive that it
must be deemed an arbitrary deprivation of property without
due process of law." 4
As in Haslip, the petitioner challenged the award in TXO on
both procedural and substantive due process grounds.75 The
Court was satisfied that adequate procedural safeguards were
present, even though the jury instructions and post-trial review
in 7XO were considerably looser than in Haslip.76 The jury in-
structions, for example, encouraged jurors to consider TXO's
wealth and informed them that one of the purposes of punitive
National Policy to Protect Due Process, 43 ALA. L. REV. 1, 2-3, 33 (1991). A more
sober view of Haslip is presented in Volz & Fayz, supra note 56.
69. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (plurality opinion).
70. Id. at 2715.
71. Id. at 2715-16.
72. Id. at 2716-17.
73. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1992),
affd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
74. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2718.
75. Id. at 2718, 2723.
76. Id. at 2723.
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damages was to provide "additional compensation" to the plain-
tiff.7 7 The Court did not find it significant that the trial judge
in TXO denied TXO's motions for remittitur and j.n.o.v. without
explanation; nor was it bothered, apparently, by the breezy non-
chalance of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals when it
reviewed the TXO case.7
In determining whether the award in TXO was "excessive," a
plurality of the Supreme Court again acknowledged a substan-
tive due process right to reasonable awards but declined to an-
nounce a generally applicable test for evaluating an award's
reasonableness (although both sides in the litigation proposed
standards of review for punitive damages).79 Justice Stevens,
writing for the plurality, noted the "understandable" desire to
formulate such a test," but stated:
In the end, then, in determining whether a particular award
is so "grossly excessive" as to violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, we return to what we said
two Terms ago in Haslip: "We need not, and indeed we can-
not, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitu-
tionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that
would fit every case. We can say, however, that [a] general
concer[n] of reasonableness.., properly enter[s] into the
constitutional calculus.""'
Instead of formulating a test, the Court turned to the specifics of
the case to determine whether, in its view, the award was rea-
sonable. Surprisingly, the Court focused not on the relationship
between actual damages and punitive damages, but on a num-
ber of other, case-specific factors that rendered the award "rea-
77. Id. at 2723 n.29.
78. Id. at 2724. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to con-
sider remittitur because TXO "and its agents and servants failed to conduct them-
selves as gentlemen." TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870,
875 (W. Va. 1992). It went on to distinguish between "really stupid" and "really
mean" defendants, commenting that for the "really stupid" defendant, a ratio of pu-
nitive damages to actual damages of roughly five to one would be acceptable, while
the limit for "really mean" defendants, such as TXO, might be as high as 500 times
the amount of actual damages without offending the Constitution. Id. at 887-89.
79. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2720 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
762 [Vol. 36:751
PUNITIVE DAMAGE OVERKILL AFTER TXO
sonable."82 These factors included: (1) the ability of punitive
damages to deter and punish, in light of TXO's wealth, (2) the
amount of money potentially at stake in the transaction that led
to the lawsuit, and (3) TXO's overall pattern of "fraud, trickery
and deceit."83
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the
result in TXO, ' focusing on whether the West Virginia courts
had provided adequate procedural safeguards in the case, such
as an instruction to the jury on the purposes of punitive damag-
es and appellate review of the award. According to Justice
Scalia, the Constitution and "[t]raditional American practice
governing the imposition of punitive damages" required no
more. 5 A constitutional literalist, Justice Scalia chastised the
plurality for relying on "Lochner-era" precedents and for explicit-
ly announcing a "'substantive due process' right that punitive
damages be reasonable.""
Justice O'Connor's strong dissent in TXO7 echoed the views
she expressed as the lone dissenting Justice in Haslip."8 Citing
the prejudicial remarks of the plaintiffs counsel at trial, the
judge's questionable instructions in the case, the lack of post-
trial review, and, above all, the "monstrous"9 size of the award,
O'Connor painted an ugly picture of "the jury's raw,
82. Id. at 2722.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2726-27. As Justice Scalia's opinion in the case illustrates, judicial con-
servatism is not always aligned with pro-business political conservatism. Judicial
conservatives like Scalia often make the charge that substantive due process is
merely a vehicle for "judges who want to write their personal beliefs into a docu-
ment that, most inconveniently, does not contain those beliefs." ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990). Al-
though it is clear from his opinion that Justice Scalia personally looks askance at
large punitive damage awards, he is true to his philosophy when he writes that "the
Constitution gives federal courts no business in [reviewing punitive awards], except
to assure that due process (i.e., traditional procedure) has been observed." TXO, 113
S. Ct. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
87. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2728-42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was
joined by Justice White and in part by Justice Souter.
88. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 42-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2728.
1995] 763
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
redistributionist impulses stemming from antipathy to a
wealthy, out-of-state, corporate defendant." ° In TXO, as in
Haslip, O'Connor agreed that due process could operate to limit
punitive damages.91 In terms of numbers or multipliers, howev-
er, substantive due process concerns clearly arise at a much
lower threshold for Justice O'Connor. O'Connor also condemned
the plurality in TXO for not erecting "a single guidepost to help
other courts find their way through this area." 2 She character-
ized the "no-mathematical-bright-line" standard in Haslip and
TXO as a cop-out and compared it to Justice Stewart's infamous
definition of obscenity: "I know it when I see it."93 Justice
O'Connor was also troubled that the plurality could uphold the
award in TXO despite even less guidance for the jury and less
meaningful post-trial review than existed in Haslip.4 Finally,
O'Connor criticized the plurality for accepting the argument that
the award in TXO was partially justified by the large amount
that TXO stood to gain by the fraudulent acts that gave rise to
the lawsuit. 5 O'Connor pointed out that this factor was not
even mentioned in the jury instructions and described it as es-
sentially "an after-the-fact rationalization invented by counsel to
defend this startling award on appeal.""
TXO reaffirms the idea that due process somehow limits pun-
ishment in the form of punitive damages. Nevertheless, as Jus-
tice Scalia correctly observed in his concurring opinion, the real
message of the case is that the Court's "constitutional sensibili-
ties" are far more resistant to "jarring" than one would have
supposed following Haslip.s7 This "bottom-line" message of TXO
should encourage state legislatures and Congress to resolve
punitive damage issues, including "overkill," legislatively.
90. Id. at 2725-26 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (characterizing Justice O'Connor's
opinion).
91. Id. at 2731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 63-64 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
92. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2731-32.
93. Id. at 2732 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
94. Id. at 2739-41.
95. Id. at 2734.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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THE JUDIcIAL LANDSCAPE AFTER TXO
As respected appeals court Judge Alex Kozinski has noted,
TXO does not necessarily "slam the door on constitutional chal-
lenges to punitive damages."8 The Supreme Court, despite its
reluctance to strike down punitive damage awards, could rule
that multiple awards trigger a "general concern of reasonable-
ness" and violate substantive due process because they go be-
yond what is necessary to deter and punish bad conduct. Such a
ruling would not be inconsistent with Haslip or TXO. However,
the Court will likely hesitate to address this issue for a number
of reasons. First, although a number of courts and commentators
have alluded to the possibility that the Court might strike down
multiple punitive awards on due process grounds,9 9 few have
contemplated what such a decision would look like. A declara-
tion by the Supreme Court that multiple awards are unconstitu-
tional would not, in itself, fashion a fair solution to the overkill
problem. In fact, it could result in a national "first comer" doc-
trine, which would create new inequities in mass tort litigation
by disadvantaging plaintiffs who "lose the race to the court-
house.""°' Perhaps sensing the pitfalls that await it, the Court
98. Synopsis, Constitutional Law Conference, 62 U.S.L.W. 2263, 2277 (Nov. 2,
1993) (quoting Judge Alex Kozinski). Since deciding TXO, the Court has demonstrat-
ed that it will entertain constitutional challenges to punitive damage awards, partic-
ularly if an award violates procedural due process. In 1994, the court reversed an
Oregon decision that held that a punitive damage award need not be "subject to a
form of post-verdict or appellate review that includes the possibility of remittitur."
Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 851 P.2d 1084, 1096 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2331
(1994). The Court stated:
The common law practice, the procedures applied by every other State,
the strong presumption favoring judicial review that we have applied in
other areas of the law, and elementary considerations of justice, all sup-
port the conclusion that such a decision should not be committed to the
unreyiewable discretion of a jury.
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2342. Honda's challenge may have suc-
ceeded where others have failed because it focused narrowly on procedural due pro-
cess and because Oregon was, until the decision, the only state that flatly denied
the right to post-verdict review of damages for excessiveness. See Claudia
MacLachlan, High Court Takes Another Look at Punitive Damages, NAVL L.J., Jan.
31, 1994, at 17.
99. See supra note 68.
100. If the Court does grant certiorari in an "overkill" case, it would be wise to do
so in one that presents class action certification issues. The Court then could give
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has steadily refused to review cases on multiple punitive
awards 1' and probably will continue to do so until after it has
reached a clearer consensus on the broader issue of whether and
under what circumstances punitive damages violate due process.
Additionally, a Supreme Court resolution of the overkill issue is
unlikely because several of the sitting Justices have expressed
the view that legislative bodies, rather than courts, can and
should act to limit unjust punitive awards."2
Before TXO, the judicial consensus was that courts could not
fashion an effective response to the "overkill" problem and were
not constitutionally obligated to do so."0 3 The Court's refusal to
curb the very large award in TXO will solidify that consensus.
In Justice Scalia's words, the TXO decision at best gives federal
judges "some, almost-never-usable, power to impose a standard
of 'reasonable punitive damages' through the clumsy medium of
the Due Process Clause.""4 Not surprisingly, judges have been
reluctant to use that ill-defined power. Accordingly, judges have
interpreted TXO to place no limitations on successive awards of
the idea of a mandatory class action some "teeth" without having to announce a
first comer doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 127-35, 148-63 (discussing
the first comer doctrine and class action reform). However, it is uncertain whether
the Court would be inclined to take this route. See infra notes 164-67 and accom-
panying text.
101. Since deciding TXO, the Court has denied certiorari in a third circuit case
upholding multiple awards in asbestos litigation. See Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371 (3d
Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993). For a discussion of this case see
infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text. Prior to TXO, the Court denied certiora-
ri in a long line of cases. See Keene Corp. v. Adams, 113 S. Ct. 461 (1992); Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. Bolyard, 113 S. Ct. 462 (1992); Solly v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Dis-
ease Fund, 966 F.2d 1454 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992); Glasscock v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1778
(1992); Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
497 U.S. 1057 (1990); Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 920 (1990); King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 942 (1991).
102. Justices Scalia and Thomas clearly believe that punitive damage reform should
be undertaken by "the proper institutions of our society" (i.e., legislatures, not
courts). TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2728 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Haslip, 499 U.S. at
39 (Scalia, J. concurring). Justice Kennedy also worries that the plurality decision in
TXO will "discourage legislative intervention that might prevent unjust punitive
awards." TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103. See supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
104. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2728 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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punitive damages.
In the months since TXO was decided, two federal appeals
courts and at least one state supreme court have upheld multi-
ple punitive awards. The Third Circuit, in Dunn v. Hovic,0 5
rejected the substantive due process challenge of a defendant
asbestos manufacturer that had been subjected to successive
punitive awards. Noting that the Supreme Court failed to re-
strict or redirect punitive damage awards in Haslip and TXO,
the court stated that it "would be intrepid indeed were we to use
this case as a vehicle to iterate a blanket policy judgement
against [multiple] punitive damages ... in light of the Supreme
Court's studied silence on the policy issue.""6 The court noted
that Congress or the state legislature would be a more appro-
priate forum than the courts in which to debate and resolve the
issue.'
In Cantrell v.. GAF Corp.,' also an asbestos case, the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently rejected the punitive
overkill argument for a third time,0 9 saying that any relief
from multiple punitive awards "should not be sought from a
federal court ... but ... from the legislature.""' In dicta, the
court cited TXO for the proposition that a due process challenge
to the multiple punitive awards in the case, if presented, would
have failed."' A recent decision of the Iowa Supreme Court
similarly relied on Haslip and TXO in ruling that repetitive
105. 1 F.3d 1371 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993).
106. Id. at 1389. Nevertheless, the original jury award of $25 million, reduced by
the district court to $2 million, was further reduced by the Third Circuit to just $1
million. Id. at 1391. Actual damages in the case were $500,000. Id. at 1363.
107. Id. at 1389. A strong dissent by Judge Weis argued for judicial resolution of
the overkill problem in asbestos litigation, especially in light of Congress' failure to
act: "Unquestionably, a national solution is needed .... It is time-perhaps past
due-to stop the hemorrhaging so as to protect future claimants." Id. at 1399 (Weis,
J., dissenting).
108. 999 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1993).
109. See also Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1569-70 (6th
Cir. 1985) (rejecting punitive overkill argument), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986);
Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 816-17 (6th Cir. 1982) (same).
110. Cantrell, 999 F.2d at 1017.
111. Id. at 1017 n.8. Admittedly, it is not clear from the opinion whether the court
is talking about substantive or procedural due process. What is significant is that
the court did not perceive TXO as placing any significant constitutional limitations
on multiple awards of punitive damages.
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awards of punitive damages are not per se unconstitutional."'
LEGISLATION
The focus of most law review commentary has been on consti-
tutional or judicial modes of attacking the multiple punitive
damages problem. Commentators have been particularly enam-
ored of due process arguments."' Given the current jurispru-
dential landscape, however, legislation is the most promising
avenue for addressing this problem. A number of innovative
proposals have been offered in recent years." 4 Four options
merit serious consideration: (1) administrative solutions, (2) a
federal "first comer" statute, (3) instructing the trier of fact, and
(4) reforming class action procedures.
Advantages of a Legislative Solution
A legislative solution offers the surest way out of the current
quagmire"1 5 and should be pursued aggressively in lieu of wait-
ing for a reluctant Supreme Court to take action. The courts,
including the Supreme Court, have urged legislative solutions on
numerous occasions." 6 Furthermore, a legislature is by nature
in a better position to bring about reform in this area."7 Legis-
112. Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 865-66 (Iowa
1994).
113. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Dam-
ages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Magarian, Challeng-
ing the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages: Putting Rules of Reason on an Un-
bounded Legal Remedy, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 485 (1990); sources cited supra note 68.
114. Some of these solutions are surveyed in AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAW-
YERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE § IV (1989) [hereinafter ACTL REPORT]; see also
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: Vol.
II, Approaches to Legal and Institutional Change 260-65 (1991) [hereinafter ENTER-
PRISE RESPONSIBILITY].
115. Such an approach has been endorsed by United States District Court Judge
William W. Schwarzer, Director of the Federal Judicial Center. William W.
Schwarzer, Punishment Ad Absurdum, 11 CAL. LAW. 116 (1991).
116. See, e.g., Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1017 (6th Cir. 1993); Dunn v.
Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1389 (3rd Cir. 1993); Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d
1085, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1778 (1992); see also supra
note 102 and accompanying text.
117. Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform-State Leg-
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latures can fashion comprehensive solutions; they are not con-
fined to the issues presented in a specific case, nor are they
swayed by sympathy for a particular plaintiff or defendant.1 '
Legislative committees have the power to solicit opinions from
all parties who may have an interest in an issue, and they may
act proactively, rather than retroactively, providing all con-
cerned with advance notice and clear guidelines." 9
A national legislative solution is preferable to state efforts at
reform for the simple reason that "one state court cannot bar [its
counterpart] in another [state] from awarding repetitive damag-
es."' 2 Not surprisingly, only a handful of states have passed
legislation specifically targeted at multiple punitive damage
awards. 2' As explained in a 1991 Reporters' Study issued by
the American Law Institute, "the state that acts alone may sim-
ply provide some relief to out-of-state manufacturers at the ex-
pense of its own citizen-victims, a situation that hardly provides
much law reform incentive for state legislators."'22 Clearly, a
reform package aimed at limiting multiple damages awards
must be enacted at the national level if it is to be at all effective.
Criteria for Evaluating Reform Proposals
In assessing the various proposals outlined below, this Note
will measure the four legislative options mentioned above'rs
using the following three criteria:
1. Simplicity. Any solution to the overkill problem should be
straightforward enough to be understood and accepted by legis-
lators and simple enough to prove practical. Intricate reforms
islatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Haslip, 42 AMi. U. L. REV. 1365, 1373-74 (1993).
118. See id. at 1373.
119. Id. at 1373-74.
120. See Schwarzer, supra note 115, at 116.
121. Georgia's "first comer" statute limits recovery to one punitive award in prod-
ucts liability cases. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (Michie 1994). A federal district
court has ruled that the Georgia statute is unconstitutional. See McBride v. General
Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990). Missouri's statute allows the de-
fendant to file a motion requesting that jury awards be credited by prior payments
of punitive damages. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(4) (Vernon 1994).
122. ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 114, at 261.
123. See supra text following note 114.
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involving little-understood aspects of civil procedure may not
pass this test. Reforms that promote judicial efficiency, such as
increased reliance on the class action mechanism, do simplify
the litigation process even though they are complex.
2. Constitutionality. Solutions that invite litigation or infringe
upon legitimate rights are unacceptable. Reforms that give cer-
tain plaintiffs an advantage over other plaintiffs, for example,
may violate the Constitution's equal protection guarantee.
3. Fairness. Reforms should bring about greater fairness in
mass tort litigation without depriving plaintiffs of their substan-
tive rights and without depriving society of the benefits of deter-
rence and punishment that are the underlying rationale for
punitive damages. Primarily, reforms should address the con-
cerns of the two classes of litigants currently disfavored by the
system: (1) defendants, who are subject to repetitive punish-
ment, and (2) "late" plaintiffs, whose ability to recover compen-
satory damages is jeopardized by the early recovery of large
punitive damage awards or settlements.
Option One: Administrative Solutions
Administrative solutions to the punitive damage overkill prob-
lem are somewhat promising, especially in the area of asbestos
litigation.124 The basic idea of administrative reform is to es-
tablish a compensation fund and empower either an agency of
the Executive Branch or the United States Claims Court to
administer it. Sources of funding would include a tax on manu-
facturers, such as manufacturers of asbestos or other products
that give rise to a large volume of litigation. Claimants who
could sufficiently document their entitlement to compensation
would be paid, without the necessity of a lengthy trial to estab-
lish liability. A major advantage of this mechanism for defen-
dant-manufacturers is that it would eliminate punitive damages,
and thus "overkill," altogether. Proponents of an administrative
124. See Asbestos Hearings, supra note 24, at 218-35 (statement of Steven Flan-
ders). The model for this proposal is the childhood vaccine program, which is ad-
ministered by the United States Claims Court and funded by an excise tax on child-
hood vaccines. See, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to -34 (1993) (establishing National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program).
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solution claim that it would lower overall transaction costs
significantly."
An administrative approach has a number of drawbacks, how-
ever. In order for a fund to be solvent, this approach would ei-
ther have to be mandatory, raising serious concerns about in-
fringement on the right to a jury trial, or it would have to enjoy
full cooperation from the affected industry. One advocate of this
solution suggests. that asbestos manufacturers would gladly
trade the uncertainties of protracted litigation and bankrupting
punitive liability for a costly, but more rational system based on
strict liability.126 Lastly, while this approach may prove useful
in products liability situations involving large numbers of claims
and a discrete industry or product, it would be impractical for
Congress to establish and fund bureaucratic mechanisms to deal
with smaller-scale mass torts.
Option Two: A Federal "First Comer" Statute
A federal "first comer" or "one bite" rule, allowing just one
award of punitive damages "up front," has the advantage of
relative simplicity. Congress once considered and rejected this
idea, in part because of the potential for a small initial punitive
award orchestrated by the defendant. 127 The American Tort Re-
form Association (ATRA) has therefore proposed a more refined
first comer proposal. The legislation proposed by ATRA would
only allow subsequent punitive damage awards where the plain-
tiff could, in a pre-trial hearing, "offer new evidence of previous-
ly undiscovered, additional wrongful behavior."12 Alternative-
ly, the court could allow a subsequent award if it determined
that the prior punitive damages "were insufficient to either
punish the defendant's wrongful conduct or to deter the defen-
dant and others from similar behavior in the future."1 29 In nei-
ther case would the jury be informed of the court's finding. In-
125. Asbestos Hearings, supra note 24, at 230 (statement of Steven Flanders).
126. Id. at 234.
127. S. 44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12 (1984).
128. American Tort Reform Association, Draft Legislation on Multiple Punitive
Damages Awards (Aug. 16, 1993) (on file with the William and Mary Law Review).
129. Id.
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stead, the court would reduce the amount of the punitive damag-
es award by the sum of punitive damages previously award-
ed.13° Although this proposed scheme is significantly more fair
to defendants than the status quo, like all first comer proposals
it favors the winner of the "race to the courthouse."131 The first
comer approach treats plaintiffs differently based on the fortuity
of timing, which may be unconstitutional as well as unfair.132
In McBride v. General Motors Corp.,3 a federal district court
ruled that Georgia's "first comer" statute denied plaintiffs equal
protection by giving the one and only punitive award to the first
plaintiff.34 Additionally, a federal statute permitting just one
award of punitive damages would have to provide substantive
rules governing that award, which would require preemption of
state substantive law on punitive damages recovery.'35
Option Three: Instructing the Trier of Fact
Another way of bringing greater fairness to the process of
assessing punitive damages in a mass tort case would be to
require the trier of fact to consider the full scope of a defendant's
punitive liability before awarding punitive damages. 3 ' Under
the Uniform Product Liability Act of 1979,' for example, the
trier of fact must take into account the financial condition of the
defendant and the "total effect of ... punishment imposed or
likely to be imposed ... as a result of the misconduct, including
130. Id.
131. This result is particularly inequitable in the case of a latent physical condition
such as asbestosis where some plaintiffs discover symptoms much later than others.
132. Such unequal treatment may also be unavoidable unless there is some mecha-
nism for identifying and joining all plaintiffs so that the total amount of punitive
damages awarded can be shared equally. See infra notes 148-77 and accompanying
text.
133. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
134. Id. at 1569.
135. For discussion of preemption issues see infra notes 172-74 and accompanying
text.
136. The American Law Institute suggests that it is "appropriate" for the trier of
fact to consider both prior awards and awards that may be granted in the future
when determining an amount of punitive damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908 cmt. e (1977).
137. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) (model legislation drafted by the Commerce De-
partment).
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punitive damage awards to persons similarly situated to the
claimant."'38  In effect, the trier of fact credits any
"downpayments" already made by the defendant on its total
punitive liability. Many states do not require such instructions
and the Supreme Court, while generally approving of instruc-
tions that place "reasonable constraints" on juror discretion,'39
has yet to hold that the Constitution requires them. Some states
have adopted this requirement in tort reform statutes, " and
provisions similar to those of the Uniform Product Liability Act
appear in legislation introduced in the 103d Congress.' Be-
cause of the obvious prejudice to the defendant of having to
introduce evidence of other punitive awards in a trial on liabili-
ty, it makes sense to couple this proposal with a bifurcated trial
procedure so that actual and punitive damages are assessed in
separate proceedings.
This approach, which focuses on the trier of fact rather than
on complex procedural reforms, has several advantages. First, it
would result in greater fairness to defendants who are subject to
multiple punitive damage liability. To the extent that it reduced
overall punitive liability, it would also preserve assets needed to
compensate future plaintiffs. Although the trier of fact would
138. Id. at 62,748.
139. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
140. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (1) (West 1992) (setting forth factors
relevant to amount of punitive damages).
141. S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(e) (1993); H.R. 1910, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 6(c) (1993). Although a senate filibuster blocked passage of this legislation in the
103d Congress, similar legislation is likely to be introduced in the 104th Congress.
Prospects for federal tort reform legislation improved following the 1994 congressio-
nal elections, which removed powerful opponents of reform from office and installed
reform-minded legislators in key committee posts. Milo Geyelin & Richard B.
Schmidt, Liability Reform Buoyed by GOP Win, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1994, at B5.
142. Federal legislation introduced in the 103d Congress provided for bifurcated
trial procedures at the request of the defendant. See S. 687, supra note 141, §
203(d); H.R. 1910, supra note 141, § 6(b). Somewhat analogous are state sentencing
statutes that allow the jury in the sentencing stage of a criminal trial to be in-
formed about prior convictions of a defendant. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
532.055 (Baldwin Supp. 1992). The rationale behind these statutes is to allow jurors
to consider prior convictions in assessing punishment, but not in determining guilt
or innocence. The analogy with punitive overkill is imperfect, however, because by
definition the civil defendant in an overkill situation is guilty of only a single act or
omission.
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remain free to impose a repetitive or cumulative award, it would
at least consider the totality of the circumstances and not render
punishment in a vacuum. As with many of the proposals consid-
ered in this Note, however, mandatory instructions for the trier
of fact would require preemption of state law governing punitive
damages.'
Another question regarding the mandatory-instructions pro-
posal is whether the government could extend this protection to
defendants in products liability lawsuits, as proposed in recent
Federal legislation,1 4 and not to defendants in other types of
actions. A federal district court recently held that Georgia's tort
reform statute, which made such a distinction, violated the
Equal Protection Clause. "5 For this reason, Congress should
consider extending the proposal to defendants in all types of
mass tort cases. Congress' inherent powers under the Commerce
Clause would certainly allow this type of legislation because
mass tort litigation itself inevitably affects interstate com-
merce-even when the accident or event giving rise to litigation
has occurred entirely within one state." 6
Finally, although this suggested reform is procedurally differ-
ent from the "first comer" approach, its effect would be similar:
early plaintiffs would collect more punitive damages than later
ones. In theory, this result makes the idea unfair and vulnerable
on equal protection grounds, although no cases have yet ad-
dressed the race-to-the-courthouse issue in the jurisdictions that
have adopted mandatory instruction requirements. However,
absent a procedure for identifying and joining all plaintiffs, no
solution exists to address this problem either in the first comer
or mandatory instructions proposals.14 7 Ideally, all plaintiffs
143. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
145. McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1569 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce is very broad. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964). In the past, Congress has enacted legislation regulating tort claims. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. 300aa-10 to -34 (1993) (establishing National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program). The courts have upheld such legislation. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (upholding constitutionality of
Price-Anderson Act, which limits tort claims against nuclear power plant operators).
147. Notwithstanding this problem, the greater simplicity of these options and the
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who succeed on the issue of liability should share equally the
total punitive damages awarded. The class action, discussed
below, offers a mechanism for achieving this result.
Option Four: Class Action Reform
The most fair solution to the overkill problem in mass tort
litigation would limit punishment to one punitive award and
divide that award equally among all successful plaintiffs. This
proposal would defer distribution of such an award until all or
most compensatory claims have been settled. " Like a "first
comer" statute, it would limit punitive damages to one award,
but that award would be determined in a separate mass trial
and would be shared equally by all plaintiffs.
Reform of existing class action procedures and changes in
other federal laws would be necessary to achieve such a system.
In any class action suit, before certifying a class, the judge must
determine that the prerequisites of "numerosity," "commonality,"
"typicality," and "adequacy of representation" are met." The
fact that they would require less intrusion onto the "turf' of state courts may make
them more likely to succeed in the legislative arena than complicated class action
reforms.
148. This idea was first outlined in Richard H. Gilden, Punitive Damages in Im-
plied Actions for Fraud Under the Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 646, 657
n.77 (1970). A court at the time dismissed it 'as "little more than academically inter-
esting." deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d. 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 1970). In
1986, the ABA endorsed a legislative solution centered on reform of class action
procedures. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMI-
NATION (REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES, SECTION OF
LITIGATION) 78-81 [hereinafter CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION]. The ABA proposal was
preceded by a flurry of law review articles recommending class action reform. See
Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1 (1985); Kevin M. Forde, Punitive Damag-
es in Mass Tort Cases: Recovery on Behalf of a Class, 15 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 397
(1984); Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (1983); Spencer
Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323 (1983); Note,
The Punitive Damage Class Action: A Solution to the Problem of Multiple Punish-
ment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 153; Note, Class Actions for Pinitive Damages, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 1787 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Class Actions]; Comment, Federal Mass Tort
Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1180 (1983);
Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1143 (1983).
149. See GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCE-
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judge must then determine which type of class action is appro-
priate. In a "prejudice" situation, where the prosecution of sepa-
rate lawsuits might adversely affect the interests of other class
members, a mandatory class action is appropriate under Federal
Rule 23(b)(1).15 This situation exists, for example, "when
claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insuffi-
cient to satisfy all claims."'51 Under this mandatory, "limited
fund" type of class action, class members may not "opt out."
Much of the punitive damage overkill litigation has focused on
this rule and on determining the threshold at which a judge
must decide that a defendant is entitled to a mandatory class.
Generally, fhe courts have held that mass tort defendants re-
questing class certification must face almost certain insolvency
before a court will grant relief in the form of a 23(b)(1) class
action.15 2 In a few cases, federal district courts have certified a
class only to have their orders vacated by an appellate court.153
DURE § 63 [A] (1989). A class action is appropriate when:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). Another type of class action is contemplated by Rule
23(b)(3), which calls for certification when questions of law or fact "predominate"
among class members and the class action would be a superior method for "the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). However, the
opt out provisions that apply to this type of class action make it useless in address-
ing the overkill problem because they permit "mass exits." CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMINA-
TION, supra note 148, at 75; see also C. Delos Putz & Peter M. Astiz, Punitive Dam-
age Claims of Class Members Who Opt Out: Should They Survive?, 16 U.S.F. L.
REV. 1 (1981) (concluding that they should not).
151. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966).
152. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that record must establish that separate puni-
tive awards would clearly and "inescapably" affect later awards), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 93 F.R.D. 875, 879 (D.S.D. 1982)
(holding that fund must be so limited that early recovery by some plaintiffs leaves
other class members with "no prospect of recovery"), affd, 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir.
1984).
153. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984), vacated,
789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); In re Federal Skywalk
Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 988 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig.,
776
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In litigation involving the infamous Dalkon Shield, claims filed
against the manufacturer had already reached $3 billion, while
the manufacturer had a net worth of just $280 million. 154 The
district court judge, concerned about the exhaustion of available
resources, found that a limited fund existed, the depletion of
which could affect future claimants. He certified a nationwide
23(b)(1) class for assessment of punitive damages based on "an
implied in law ceiling on the amount of punitive damages that
may be assessed against the defendant company."'55 His con-
cern was not just with the proper interpretation of Rule 23(b)(1),
or-with the depletion of funds, but with the due process rights of
the defendant:
A rule 23(b)(1)(B) nationwide class action for punitive
damages obviates many of the abuses inherent in multiple
punitive damage awards. A defendant has a due process right
to be protected against unlimited multiple punishment for
the same act.
A defendant in a civil action has a right to be protected
against double recoveries.., because overlapping damage
awards violate that sense of "fundamental fairness" which
lies at the heart of constitutional due process. Certainly the
principle of res judicata, the notion that litigation must come
to an end, that a party cannot sue or be sued repeatedly on
the same cause of action, is part of the process that is due
under our constitutional system. 56
The courts have also been reluctant to grant class action sta-
tus in mass tort situations because of language in a 1966 Advi-
sory Committee Note accompanying Rule 23. That note states
that "[a] 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous per-
526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983). But see In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100
F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1004 (1988).
154. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 897.
155 Id. at 898.
156. Id. at 899. The Court of Appeals treated this constitutional argument briefly,
saying only that "no rule of law limits the amount of punitive damages a jury may
award." Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d. at 852. For further compelling (but unsuccessful)
arguments in favor of class certification, see In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d
1175, 1184-93 (8th Cir. 1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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sons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of
the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but
of liability and defenses of liability, would be present, affecting
the individuals in different ways."57 While this observation
may be true in determining liability, no reason exists why it
should apply to the determination of punitive damages, which is
not plaintiff-specific but rather based on the egregiousness of the
defendant's conduct.158
In light of the significant precedent against certification of
mandatory classes, the ABA has recommended a strengthening
of Rule 23(b)(1) so that the threshold for invocation of a manda-
tory class would be "a reasonable possibility that adequate com-
pensatory damages will not be available if punitive damages are
not brought under control."'59 Under the ABA proposal, state
cases as well as federal cases would be consolidated, federal law
would apply, and one mass trial would decide the punitive dam-
ages component of the claims. 6 ' Punitive damages would be
distributed equally, with some withheld, if necessary, for future
class members. The result of the trial on punitive damages
would bind all victims/plaintiffs, including future or unascer-
tained claimants. 6'
Although a complex endeavor, reformation of class action
procedures as outlined here would be simpler than some other
proposed procedural changes.'62 The courts have already had
experience and success with class action lawsuits, as in the case
of Agent Orange litigation.'63 Furthermore, consolidating trials
157. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, advisory committee's note (1966). See, e.g., Dalkon Shield,
693 F.2d at 852. Citing federal judges who have disagreed that class actions are per
se inappropriate in mass tort litigation, one commentator sensibly proposes elimina-
tion of this comment from the Rules. Note, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?:
Suggested Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass
Tort Litigation, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461, 496 (1988).
158. This argument assumes no choice of law problems (i.e., federal standards for
punitive liability have been established). See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying
text.
159. CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION, supra note 148, at 79.
160. Id. at 78-81.
161. Id.
162. Such as those involving multidistrict litigation and interpleader. See ACTL
REPORT, supra note 114, at 23-25.
163. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
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on punitive liability would promote judicial efficiency.
Moreover, these reforms are probably constitutional. In 1985,
the Supreme Court suggested in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts' 4 that a plaintiff's ability to "opt out" of a class action
amounted to a fundamental right,6 ' thus calling into question
the constitutionality of all mandatory class actions. 66 Howev-
er, recent federal case law makes it clear that Shutts was a
"limited holding" and that the ability to opt out is closer to being
a constitutional nicety than a fundamental right.'67 This limi-
tation is especially true in the case of punitive damages,1 6 to
which a plaintiff has no constitutional entitlement.'69 Many
state governments have restricted or abolished the punitive
damages remedy without running afoul of the Constitution.7 '
aff/d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
164. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
165. Id. at 811-12.
166. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 7, 39
(1986); Kurt A. Schwarz, Due Process and Equitable Relief in the State Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 68 TEX. L. REV. 415 (1989);
Note, supra note 157, at 474.
167. Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 770 F. Supp. 1499, 1516-17 (N.D. Ala.
1991), affd, 974 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2999 (1993).
168. See In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 620 F. Supp. 873, 876 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (refusing
to afford opt out rights to members of a punitive damages class).
169. In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1319-20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
976 (1980) ("So far is this opportunity from being a fundamental personal right that
it is an interest not truly personal in nature at all. It is rather a public interest.").
The court in this case upheld provisions in the California Code (since modified)
barring recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death cases. Id. at 1319-20. The
United States Supreme Court has characterized as a "windfall" punitive damages for
plaintiffs who have already been "fully compensated" with an award of actual dam-
ages. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981).
170. See supra note 22 (listing states that disallow punitive damages in all or most
circumstances). Some states allow punitive damages but limit the amount that can
be recovered, either by setting a maximum dollar amount or by establishing a multi-
plier of actual damages as a ceiling. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (1993) (punitive
award may not exceed three times compensatory damages); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-
5.1(e) (Michie 1994) ($250,000 cap); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (1993) ($350,000 cap
on punitive damages). Courts have recently upheld statutory caps in Virginia and
Georgia as constitutional. Wackenhut Applied Technologies Ctr., Inc. v. Sygnetron
Protection Sys., 979 F.2d 980, 985 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Virginia's statutory cap on puni-
tive damages is an economic regulation . . . the Fourteenth Amendment requires
only that an economic regulation bear a rational relation to a proper governmental
purpose."); Bagley v. Shortt, 410 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga. 1991) (holding that Georgia's
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It therefore seems beyond dispute that Congress could restrict
punitive damages to one award, equally shared, for each wrong-
ful act or course of conduct that results in mass injury. Plaintiffs
may complain that such mandatory class actions deprive them of
autonomy, or that they inconveniently postpone the collection of
punitive damages. These concerns, while not trivial, do not rise
to the level of constitutional objections.' 7 ' Because punitive
damages are a windfall to the plaintiff, sharing them or waiting
for them does not work any hardship.
Such class action reforms, however, raise serious federalism
concerns because they would require significant intrusion into
the autonomy of state courts and legislatures. Congress logically
would have to create federal substantive law governing punitive
damage liability in mass torts, which it could do by statute un-
der the Erie doctrine.'72 This body of punitive damages law
would preempt state substantive laws, which vary substantially
as to both the type of misconduct that will warrant punitive
damages and the level of proof required to prove such miscon-
duct. In addition to relying on its broad powers under Article III
and under the Supremacy Clause, Congress could justify such
displacement of state law, especially in the products liability
context, as a measure necessary to regulate interstate com-
merce. "' Finally, in order to make the mandatory class action
concept work, legislation must empower the federal courts to
$250,000 cap on punitive damages does not violate due process, equal protection, or
the right of access to the courts).
171. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1988) ("[A] person, although not a
party, [may have] . . . his interests adequately represented by someone with the
same interests who is a party."); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940)
(holding that a litigant's right to an individual hearing is qualified by the power of
legislatures to create, where appropriate, litigation schemes that aggregate claims, so
long as adequate representation is provided); see also Richard D. Freer, Avoiding
Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court's Role in Defin-
ing the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PIT. L. REV. 809, 813 (1989) ("A plaintiff is entitled
to due process, but has no right to sole possession of center stage; we need to tell
the prima donna of the legal world that she must work with some co-stars.").
172. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Rules of Decision Act pro-
vides that: "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1992).
173. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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stay state court proceedings on punitive damages. The Anti-
Injunction Act contemplates this kind of infringement on the
power of state courts only in limited situations, such as bank-
ruptcy.1
74
In addition to promoting judicial efficiency, a consolidated
trial on punitive liability would be more fair to defendants be-
cause they would be "deterred and punished" all at once and no
longer subjected to repetitive awards. At the same time, the one
punitive award would continue to serve the socially desirable
goals of punishment and deterrence. Such a system, if it gave
priority to claims for actual damages and delayed distribution of
punitive damages, could also eliminate the unfairness of losing
the race to the courthouse or discovering a cause of action "too
late" (as in the case of a latent medical condition).
For all its virtues, however, the ABA proposal does not ad-
dress the situation in which a solvent defendant is subjected to
multiple punishment. In a 1989 report, the American College of
Trial Lawyers correctly noted that "the unfairness of mulcting a
defendant more than once for the same conduct does not dimin-
ish with the prospect that there may be sufficient funds to pay
all awards."7 ' Rule 23 should be concerned, not just with
avoiding prejudice to class members, but with promoting judicial
efficiency and treating all litigants as fairly as possible. The
Rule should therefore allow the certification of a mandatory
class whenever (a) the traditional requirements for class certifi-
cation are present 76 and (b) a defendant faces unfair and re-
petitive punishment for the same act or course of conduct. 7
174. The Anti-Injunction Act states that: "A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly autho-
rized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect
or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1993). One author has. argued that
FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(b)(1) should be considered as an "Act of Congress" exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act. Under this argument, federal courts already have the power
to stay state court proceedings in overkill situations. See Note, Class Actions, supra
note 148, at 1810-12. This argument was rejected by In re Federal Skywalk Cases,
680 F.2d 1175, 1182-83 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
175. ACTL REPORT, supra note 114, at 22.
176. See supra note 149.
177. Another commentator has proposed a sound, if poorly worded, revision to Rule
23 that would require the court to consider "the extent to which independent puni-
tive damage awards to prior individual plaintiffs would cause a court in subsequent
19951 781
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Changing Rule 23 in this fashion would not eliminate punitive
damages, or restrict in any way a plaintiffs entitlement to com-
pensation for actual damages. It would, however, require consol-
idation of trials in federal court whenever necessary to avoid un-
fair punitive overkill, regardless of whether the defendant has
deep or shallow pockets.
CONCLUSION
Practical and constitutional obstacles have prevented the
courts from resolving the problem of punitive damages overkill.
According to- the Supreme Court in TXO, the Constitution places
only ill-defined, and as yet unreached, due process limitations on
the extent of punitive damage liability. Whether the Court
should have ruled or reasoned differently in TXO depends large-
ly on how expansive a view of due process one's judicial philoso-
phy permits. However, TXO cannot be seen as an invitation to
wait for "creative" judicial resolution of the overkill problem.
Rather, for legislators concerned about punitive overkill, TXO
should be considered a call to arms.
Congress should take advantage of its broad powers under
Article III, the Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy Clause to
enact national solutions to the overkill problem. These solutions
should be simple, constitutional, and fair to all litigants. All of
the proposals discussed in this Note would alleviate the overkill
situation and make the world of mass torts more just. However,
only comprehensive class action reform promises a significantly
more fair and more rational approach to the adjudication of
punitive damage claims in mass tort litigation. Congress should
waste no time in reforming Rule 23 to make the certification of
mandatory classes easier to obtain for defendants facing oppres-
sive punitive damage overkill.
Jonathan Hadley Koenig
litigation to find the defendant had been sufficiently punished so that no further
awards of punitive damages would be made." Note, supra note 157, at 491.
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